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AGAINST CONTEXTUALISM ABOUT PRUDENTIAL DISCOURSE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers have urged that we embrace contextualism about many forms of  evaluative language.  In 1
recent times, there has been a surge of  interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about 
prudential discourse — thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone’s 
well-being. In this paper I examine in detail, and seek to reject, two recent cases for radical forms of  
prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova argues for 
the view that the semantic content of  terms like ‘well-being’ and ‘doing well’ varies across different 
contexts. Campbell proposes that there are plural prudential concepts at play in prudential discourse (and 
in philosophical reflection upon such discourse) despite the general assumption of  uniformity and that 
we find evidence of  this by looking at the conflicting commitments of  prudential discourse.  
 The negative aim of  the paper is to show that Alexandrova and Campbell have not given us a 
good case for ambitious forms of  contextualism about prudential discourse. The positive aim of  the 
paper is to provide alternative, non-contextualist, explanations of  the features of  prudential discourse 
that their discussions highlight.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I outline Alexandrova’s contextualism, arguing 
that although she draws our attention to one element of  prudential discourse that is context-sensitive 
(judgements and claims about someone ‘doing well’) we should reject her deeper, more radical, kind of  
contextualism about prudential discourse. I do so by showing how all of  the relevant data is better 
accommodated by a non-contextualist alternative which I call Aspectualism. I then (§§4-5) turn to 
Campbell’s arguments for conceptual pluralism, arguing that he fails to identify mutually-conflicting, 
fundamental, commitments of  prudential discourse. 
 For a small sample of  such proposals see: Baker (2012), Björnsson & Finlay (2010), DeRose (1992), Dowell 1
(2011), Finlay (2014), Jenkins & Nolan (2010), Sundell (2011).
!1
2. ALEXANDROVA’S CONTEXTUALISM 
Anna Alexandrova has recently outlined a radical form of  contextualism about prudential discourse. 
Let me first describe the data that she introduces before outlining and assessing the range of  options 
that she considers in response to it. 
 First, Alexandrova points out that people make apparently prudential claims, and ask (e.g.) ‘how 
are you doing?’, in a variety of  contexts. She gives three cases where someone asks someone, Masha, 
how she is doing: (1) a Good Samaritan when Masha has fallen on ice (2) a good friend in confidence 
(3) a social worker checking on Masha as a new parent. In each case, it is stipulated that the interlocutor 
asks Masha how she is doing. Alexandrova contends that: 
[W]e witness three judgements that are ostensibly about Masha’s well-being. Nothing changes 
in her life, and yet in each case a different standard of  well-being is used. The Good Samaritan 
has in mind neither flourishing nor positive mental states but rather the physical comfort of  a 
heavily pregnant woman walking on ice. So long as Masha is not terribly in pain and can get 
home all right, the Good Samaritan is justified in judging her to be well. In the second case, the 
caring friend’s concern is a richer notion of  well-being—probably closest to what philosophers 
call ‘well-being’. When she asks Masha how she is doing, she has in mind whether Masha is 
fulfilling her hopes and whether she is depressed. So the friend justifiably concludes that 
Masha is not doing well. Finally, the social worker is employing yet another notion of  well-
being, most akin to quality of  life. […] Masha is a member of  the patrimonial middle class, which 
makes it likely that she will not fall through the cracks when she hits a vulnerable stage in life. 
She also has lots of  people and resources to count on. Those two things are enough for well-
being as far as the social worker is concerned.  
[T]he threshold that separates well-being from ill-being—that is, how much of  a given good 
Masha must have in order to qualify as doing well—and the factors that count for well-being 
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appear to vary across our three cases. I call these threshold and constitutive dependence, 
respectively. How should philosophy accommodate them?  2
It is important to distinguish the data that Alexandrova identifies from the best explanation of that data. 
In order not to prejudge the latter issue, I will characterise the data points in quite rough terms. The 
first one is: 
 Data point 1: Across different contexts, the uses of  (i) ‘doing well’ and (ii) ‘are you ok?’ seem  
  importantly different.  
A second datum that Alexandrova introduces is the plurality of  ways in which ‘well-being’ is used 
across different academic disciplines: 
This problem is magnified when we turn our attention to the scientific, rather than the 
everyday, context. Here, we do not even need to assume that ‘How are you doing?’ is a question 
about well-being. Researchers all across the social and medical sciences use the term ‘well- 
being’ freely and abundantly…It is a term used to refer to a minimal quality of  life in 
development economics; to a health-related quality of  life in medicine; to a child’s access to 
decent schooling, healthcare, and parental love in disciplines that study children; to mental 
health in psychiatry and clinical psychology; and so on and so forth.  3
Let me recast this as follows: 
 Data point 2: the uses of  ‘well-being’ across different disciplines seem importantly different. 
 Alexandrova (2017: 8).2
 Alexandrova (2017: 9).3
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To make things maximally clear up front, my strategy in the subsequent discussion is to agree with 
Alexandrova about the data points (as I have characterised them) but to mostly disagree with her about 
the best explanation of  them.  
 Alexandrova describes three possible views that one could take in response to these 
observations: Circumscriptionism, Differential Realisation, and, her preferred view, Contextualism. She 
outlines these as follows: 
  
Circumscriptionism 
 The first possibility is just to deny the significance of  the diversity in question. One could claim  
 that this diversity, to the extent that it exists, is a mistake or an instance of  linguistic carelessness 
 on the part of  those who use ‘well-being’ outside its proper context. Well-being proper is that  
 general, all-things-considered evaluation that philosophers have been concerned about.  4
Differential Realisation 
Another possibility is to accommodate the diversity that the Circumscriptionist rejects. Perhaps 
there is a stable content for well-being expressions (an assumption shared with the 
Circumscriptionist), but different states realise well-being in different circumstances […] For 
instance, well-being might consist purely in one’s emotional balance when ascribed to a 
depression sufferer, or in one’s access to basic medicine and education in an environment of  
deep poverty, or in realisation of  one’s dreams and ideals when we evaluate someone’s life as a 
whole. On this view, the semantic content of  the term ‘well-being’ does not change with each 
change in the environment. Only the truth-makers of  the state ‘is doing well’ (or ‘is not doing 
well’) change with context.   5
Contextualism 
 Alexandrova (2017: 5).4
 Alexandrova (2017: 5).5
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[C]ontextualism about well-being would maintain that the semantic content of  sentences in 
which ‘well-being’ and its cognates occur depends, at least in part, on the context in which it is 
uttered. A developmental economist might just mean something different by ‘well-being’ than 
does a clinical psychologist. On this view it is impossible to speak of  well-being simpliciter. 
Rather, the content of  well-being assertions needs to be indexed to specific circumstances 
(doctor’s visit, poverty relief  on country-wide scale, heart-to-heart conversation with a friend, 
etc.). Since these circumstances will inevitably differ from situation to situation, so will the 
semantic content of  ‘well-being’. In one situation it will connote a concern of  a doctor for their 
patient, in another of  a social worker for his clients, or of  a therapist for her depressed patient, 
and so on and so forth. The context of  an all-things-considered evaluation privileged by 
philosophers is just that: one of  the many contexts in which well-being is in question.  6
Alexandrova rejects circumscriptionism and differential realisation, holding that contextualism is the best 
explanation of  the relevant data. I think that this is a mistake. Before explaining why, I will first present 
the three alternatives in a slightly different way, to make the differences between them maximally clear: 
 Circumscriptionism:  “well-being” (like ‘doing well’) only ever refers to exactly one state type,  
 regardless of  context. 
 Differential Realization: (1) “well-being” (like ‘doing well’) only ever refers to exactly one   
 state type, regardless of  context. (2) different properties ground that property across    
 different contexts.  
The following schematic example helps to illustrate differential realisation:  
  
In context A, “X is doing well” ascribes property P, whose grounds are X, Y, Z. 
In context B, “X is doing well” ascribes property P, whose grounds are A, B, C. 
 Alexandrova (2017: 5).6
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The third alternative that Alexandrova introduces is contextualism:  
 Contextualism: (1) “well-being” (like ‘doing well’) refers to different state types across   
 different contexts. (2) different properties ground the relevant property across different   
 contexts. 
The following schematic example helps us to understand contextualism:  
In context A, “X is doing well” ascribes property P, whose grounds are X, Y, Z. 
In context B, “X is doing well” ascribes property Q, whose grounds are A, B, C. 
3. ASSESSING ALEXANDROVAN CONTEXTUALISM 
I intend to argue that Alexandrova’s Contextualism, as outlined above, is not the best explanation of  the 
data points that she presents. Let me state my specific theses up front, to aid the reader. My first main 
claim is that the use of  ‘doing well’ is context sensitive. Different levels of  well-being count as doing 
well in different contexts. My second main claim is that, pace Alexandrova, the use of  ‘well-being’ etc in 
different academic contexts is best explained by an innocent form of  circumscriptionism. Finally, pace 
Alexandrova, I hold that in everyday contexts we make judgements about different aspects of  well-being 
and how well someone is doing with respect to those aspects. I now move on to assessing 
Alexandrova’s contextualism and arguing that my view is superior.  
 Let us start by considering data point 2. It is undeniable that people from diverse subjects label 
that which they study as ‘well-being’. The view that this is best explained by (something like) 
circumscriptionism might seem to manifest dogmatism. However, we see that this is not the case once 
we realise the close connection between the distinct subjects of  these studies. 
 We can distinguish between at least the following. Firstly, a person’s level of  well-being, either at a 
time or over a period of  time (including a whole life). Secondly, the positive and negative constituents of  
well-being (that which has non-instrumental prudential value and disvalue). Thirdly, there are instrumental 
means to improving a person’s well-being. Fourthly, there are necessary means or pre-conditions to a person 
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either having a level of  well-being or their level of  well-being improving. There are also reliable indicators 
of  well-being. Finally there are different levels of  well-being that we might be interested in. One of  these 
is the level of  a person’s well-being that qualifies as a good life or doing well. Another one is the level of  a 
person’s well-being that qualifies as a minimally good life. (There are, of  course, further distinctions we 
could make). 
 These distinctions are subtle and, crucially, unimportant for many subjects beyond philosophy 
because the practical difference between them is minimal or non-existent. For example, the difference 
between constituents of  well-being, means to improving well-being, and necessary preconditions of  
having or improving a level of  well-being, would (presumably) not be very important to many outside 
of  philosophy. After all, the general point holds across these categories that in general the more 
someone has of  the relevant thing, the better off  they are. 
 I think circumscriptionism, minus the claims of  carelessness, is true for the use of  ‘well-being’ 
across different subjects, such as the social and medical sciences. When people in different subjects use 
these terms they refer to distinct things (and usually things distinct from well-being itself). These might 
be something from one, or more than one, of  the categories identified above or from categories that 
require further similar distinctions. They may also simply function as stipulated technical terms, ones 
not intended to play the same role as the everyday term ‘well-being’. 
 Contrary to Alexandrova’s formulation of  circumscriptionism, it is not that these other subjects 
manifest carelessness. It is rather that the theoretical and practical purposes served by these subjects make 
it appropriate for them to label different — but closely related — things as ‘well-being’. Some subjects 
are interested in particular constituents of  well-being, or in particular ways of  promoting well-being, some are 
interested in particular levels of  well-being. Other subjects are interested in these questions but restricted 
to sub-groups of  the population, such as children. Thus they are talking about a cluster of  closely 
related things, all of  which are the subject of  study because they are connected to well-being or aspects 
of  it. It is thus no accident, and no grounds for criticism, that different subjects label these different 
things ‘well-being’.  This is a perfectly innocent kind of  loose talk.  7
 Similar patterns are observable for ‘utility’, ‘welfare’, ‘happiness’ and the like.7
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 Having discussed the second data point, I will now examine Alexandrova’s first data point. 
Looking at data point 1, Alexandrova provides this useful distinction between two different kinds of  
contextual variation where each is essential to her contextualism: 
[T]he threshold that separates well-being from ill-being—that is, how much of  a given good 
Masha must have in order to qualify as doing well—and the factors that count for well-being 
appear to vary across our three cases. I call these threshold and constitutive dependence[.] 
According to Alexandrova, ‘doing well’ judgements manifest threshold dependence whereas ‘well-being’ 
judgements manifest constitutive dependence. It will be useful to examine these separately, partly because I 
want to grant threshold dependence for ‘doing well’ judgements (and similar ones) as a genuine 




Alexandrova is right that whether someone counts as doing well depends upon context. This is analogous 
to the way that whether someone counts as tall depends on the context. In different contexts, there are 
different minimum heights that one must be to qualify as tall.   8
 In a similar fashion, different levels of  well-being will count as doing well in different contexts 
because the relevant qualifying level of  well-being will be different. For example, take the question of  
whether our friend Jules is doing well. In one context it is true to say that Jules is not doing well. 
Perhaps Jules is, by far, the worst off  of  our friends. However, in another context it will be true to say 
that Jules is doing well because, of  the people alive presently, they have one of  the highest levels of  
well-being (it is just that all of  their friends are doing even better). There are thus two different 
judgements that can be made of  Jules. They are doing well for someone alive right now but they are not 
doing well for someone in their friendship group. 
 Compare here the contextualist view of  Jenkins & Nolan (2010) for ‘is permissible’ and the like.8
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 Here is another example in support of  threshold dependence. You are in an accident and 
severely injured. After a few days your injuries have begun responding to treatment and you are 
recovering in bed. Your friend comes to visit you a few days apart and, upon returning, remarks “You’re 
doing really well.” In context it is clear that the threshold for doing well has been shifted down. You are 
not doing well on the everyday standard for doing well but you are doing well for someone who was recently 
in a bad accident. 
 There will be countless other ways in which we can set a minimum level of  well-being such that 
someone counts as doing well or not doing well. This can be achieved by implicit or explicit indexing 
of  these judgements as in ‘doing well for an X’ where ‘X’ can be related to sex, age, occupation, the 
period of  history the person lives, or any other way of  categorising. For example we might say that 
“Jules is doing well for an older man”. The addition of  ‘for an older man’ adjusts the level of  well-being 
that the subject must have in order to count as doing well. How does it do this? Presumably by 
provoking us to make our judgements sensitive to our antecedent expectations of  someone in that 
group’s level of  well-being. For example, (suppose) we judge that older men typically have lower levels 
of  well-being than the general population of  humans and then assess Jules’ level of  well-being against 
this particular standard. 
 Thus I agree with Alexandrova that our judgements about whether someone is doing well, 
doing ok, or doing badly, manifest context-dependence. That is because in addition to a fully general 
assessment of  someone’s level of  well-being we can, and commonly do, commonly assess that level 
against a contextually determined threshold for doing well. Threshold dependence is thus a real 
phenomenon. But notice that it does not support Alexandrova’s contextualism, given that that view 
encompasses two claims: 
 Contextualism: (1) “well-being” (like ‘doing well’) refers to different state types across   
 different contexts. (2) different properties ground the relevant property across different   
 contexts. 
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We’ve seen that (1) is true, applied to ‘doing well’, by seeing that ‘doing well’ refers to different levels of  
well-being across different contexts. But nothing so far has shown that (2) is true. The explanation of  
threshold dependence — that different levels of  well-being count as doing well across different 
contexts and that we can often index someone’s level of  well-being (against e.g. people of  the same age 
or gender) — was entirely compatible with well-being itself  being context-insensitive (like height). We 
thus need to examine (2), by examining constitutive dependence. 
Constitutive Dependence  
Alexandrova argues that different goods are relevant to different assessments of  well-being in different 
contexts. Let us remember the three cases that Alexandrova gives to motivate this claim: 
The Good Samaritan […] So long as Masha is not terribly in pain and can get home all right, 
the Good Samaritan is justified in judging her to be well. In the second case, the caring friend’s 
concern is a richer notion of  well-being—probably closest to what philosophers call ‘well-
being’. When she asks Masha how she is doing, she has in mind whether Masha is fulfilling her 
hopes and whether she is depressed. So the friend justifiably concludes that Masha is not doing 
well. Finally, the social worker is employing yet another notion of  well-being, most akin to 
quality of  life. To use Thomas Piketty’s term, Masha is a member of  the patrimonial middle class, 
which makes it likely that she will not fall through the cracks when she hits a vulnerable stage 
in life. She also has lots of  people and resources to count on. Those two things are enough for 
well-being as far as the social worker is concerned.  9
No single response adequately explains all of  these data points. The last case, the social worker, seems 
one for which circumscriptionism is plausible. As we saw above, a cluster of  closely-related things are 
called ‘well-being’ across different subject matters and it is plausible that the social worker’s job is to 
assess the extent to which one has certain resources that are (at least) instrumental means to well-being. 
 Alexandrova (2017: 7).9
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She is there to assess the extent to which people have these resources, on the presumption that they are 
reliable means to (or preconditions of) sufficient prudential value for parents and infants.  
 Here is evidence for this interpretation. Suppose that the social worker reports “Masha is doing 
well” and a passing philosopher interjects and presses the social worker on whether she really knows 
that Masha is doing well. Presumably, if  pressed like this, the social worker would not reply (e.g.) that 
these goods that (she has verified that) Masha has access to are, really, the only constituents of  well-
being and so yes Masha is, ipso facto, doing well. After all, it is clear that one could have money and 
people close to you but not live well. Rather, it seems likely that the social worker would reply by saying 
that her job is to see that Masha has these things (on the assumption that they are relevant to, because 
reliable sources of, well-being) and that everything beyond this is outside her remit. Her ‘doing well’ 
report was just loose talk about reliable means to well-being. 
 The different contexts where well-being reports are made will sometimes exhibit (perfectly 
reasonable) loose talk for which circumscriptionism is plausible. That explains what goes on in the 
social worker case. The other two cases, however, manifest a different kind of  variation, one for which 
circumscription (alone) as a response is implausible but which, I will argue, do not tell in favour of  
contextualism (or differential realisation). Instead, these cases show how we focus on different aspects of  
well-being in different contexts, depending on what is salient. 
 The Good Samaritan asks (fallen) Masha if  she is ok. How should we interpret this?  Plausibly, 10
the Samaritan is asking something about Masha’s present level of  well-being, in light of  the highly salient 
fact that Masha has just fallen over on ice. I suggest that the Good Samaritan is asking about one aspect 
of Masha’s well-being, her hedonic state (balance of  pleasure over pain).  When the Samaritan judges, 11
or reports, that Masha is doing ok they are not judging her overall level of  well-being. They are judging 
her to be doing sufficiently well in one respect, or along one dimension, of  well-being. 
 We see evidence for this by imagining two different ways that the conversation could go. 
 There’s some plausibility to circumscriptionism here, given that Masha’s inquiry might be about something 10
related to, but distinct from well-being, such as whether Masha has broken something.
 Perhaps coupled with her physical state (on the assumption that this is a productive means to prudential value 11
and disvalue or perhaps even a constituent).
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Version 1 
 Samaritan: “Are you ok?” 
 Masha: “I’m fine, thanks.” 
 Samaritan: “I’m glad you’re ok.” 
 Samaritan (later, to third party): “I checked on her and she was ok.” 
 Third party: “No she isn’t. I’ve seen her around looking sad, and she doesn’t seem to have any  
 friends around here, and her partner just lost their job.” 
 Samaritan: “Right, fine. But physically she is doing ok.” 
Version 2 
 Samaritan: “Are you ok?” 
 Masha: “I’m fine, thanks. But my life is going terribly. I don’t have any friends or money and  
 my partner just lost their job.” 
In version 1, Good Samaritan makes a judgement about an aspect of  well-being — Masha’s hedonic 
condition and perhaps also her physical condition. For the sake of  brevity they will express this by 
saying that she’s ‘doing ok’ but their judgement is that she is doing ok in this respect. Evidence for this 
comes from what they will say when pressed by a third party — namely that, in spite of  the surface 
appearance, they are not making a judgement about her overall well-being, only one aspect of  it. 
 In version 2, Masha’s first sentence allows Samaritan to form a judgement about one aspect of  
her well-being. Masha’s second sentence, however, changes the focus of  the conversation by making 
salient her well-being as a whole, making that the focus of  the conversation.  Once Masha does this, 12
Samaritan cannot, as in version 1, simply address one aspect of  her well-being and say “I’m glad you’re 
ok”. Such an utterance would seem both bizarre and callous. Similarly, Samaritan will have to report the 
 On the idea of  the common-ground of  the conversation see especially: Grice (1989), Lewis (1979), Stalnaker 12
(2002).
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incident to a third party differently from in version 1, by saying something such as “Physically she was 
ok, but she was doing very badly overall”. 
 My proposal is that Masha’s falling over, and this being common knowledge to both parties, 
makes salient one aspect or dimension of  her well-being — the hedonic aspect. Samaritan’s inquiries into 
how Masha is doing are then treated as inquiries into how she is doing in that respect. But this is not 
fixed. Either party can shift the conversation to a more general, or fully general, assessment of  well-
being.  
 Here is an analogy to support the point. Suppose an electrician is employed by the government 
to provide free wiring checks for those soon to be having children living with them. The electrician 
checks an apartment and reports to their supervisor “the apartment is safe”. Clearly, though, there are 
sources of  danger for a child beyond electrical faults, so the electrician has not determined that it is safe 
overall. Suppose that a passer-by points this out. Presumably the electrician will concede that their talk 
was loose — they haven’t verified that the apartment is safe overall — but clarify that their job is to 
assess one aspect of  overall safety and that everything else is beyond their remit and was excluded from 
what they were reporting.  
 I have offered an account of  what goes on in the cases of  the social worker and the Good 
Samaritan. In each case the context is one where they are focused on either one aspect of  well-being or 
some particular set of  productive or constitutive means to well-being. In each case this is not a fixed 
feature of  the conversation. It is easy for it to shift to a more, or less, general assessment of  the 
relevant person’s well-being. 
 How does this analysis compare with Alexandrova’s? Importantly, my analysis contradicts 
Alexandrova’s constitutive dependence claim and thus her contextualism: 
 Contextualism: (1) “well-being” refers to different state types across different contexts. (2)   
 different properties ground the relevant property across different contexts. 
According to Alexandrova, across these different contexts, ‘well-being’ refers to different states which are, 
in turn, grounded by different properties.  My alternative proposal is that, across these different 
!13
contexts, people refer to different aspects of  one common thing: well-being. There is not a plurality of  
states ascribed by ‘well-being’ with a plurality of  grounds. Rather there is contextually-determined focus 
on different aspects of  well-being combined with a certain degree of  loose talk. 
 How can we tell the difference between these two views? Note, first, that on Alexandrova’s 
view there will be a lot of  talking past each other. For example, suppose that the friend in the Masha 
story meets the Samaritan. In response to the question: “how is Masha doing?” the friend will say: 
“Masha is not doing ok” whereas the Good Samaritan would say “Masha is doing ok.” On 
Alexandrova’s view there is no tension whatsoever between these two judgements or their expression in 
this fashion by the two interlocutors. According to Alexandrova, the Good Samaritan attributes 
property P, whose grounds are X, Y, Z, whereas the friend denies the attribution of  property Q, whose 
grounds are A, B, C. Given that P and Q are, according to Alexandrova, distinct properties,  there is no  13
real disagreement here. Put schematically, the situation is thus: 
In context A, “X is doing well” ascribes property P, whose grounds are X, Y, Z. 
In context B, “X is not doing well” is to refuse to ascribe property Q, whose grounds are A, B, C. 
This generates the prediction that the following exchange should be perfectly felicitous: 
 Samaritan: “Masha is doing ok.” 
 Friend: “Yes. And Masha is not doing ok.” 
I assume that we do not think that Friend’s reply is perfectly appropriate. Rather, it seems that the 
conversation should go something like this: 
 Samaritan: “Masha is doing ok.” 
 One question for a radical form of  contextualism like Alexandrova’s is what makes these properties related, 13
such that they are both well-being judgements. My hunch is that it will be difficult to answer this question in a 
plausible way without contextualism evolving into aspectualism.
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 Friend: “No, Masha is not doing ok. I’ve seen her around looking sad, and she doesn’t seem to  
  have any friends around here, and her partner just lost their job” 
 Samaritan: “Ok, but physically she’s doing ok.” 
On my alternative, aspectualist, analysis, Friend and Samaritan are not simply talking past each other, as on 
Alexandrova’s view. Rather, they have one common subject matter — well-being — and (at least one of  
them is) engaged in acceptable loose talk in expressing their view. So rather than simply proceeding as 
if  their claims are not in tension with each other — “Yes. And Masha is not doing ok.” — they instead 
recognise that at least one of  them is engaged in loose talk and then make more explicit their non-
conflicting propositions (Samaritan asserts that Masha is doing ok physically speaking whereas Friend 
asserts that Masha is not doing ok overall).  
 Remember the first of  the data points that Alexandrova introduced: 
 Data point 1: Across different contexts, the uses of  (i) ‘doing well’ and (ii) ‘are you ok?’ seem  
  importantly different. 
It seems plausible that there is something different between the judgements that Samaritan and friend 
make in the Masha cases. But Alexandrova’s view explains this such that there is too great a difference. It 
is too great a difference because, on her contextualist view, there is no disagreement at all between: 
 Samaritan: “Masha is doing ok.” 
 Friend: “Masha is not doing ok.” 
On the alternative view that I have developed here, we preserve the sense that Friend cannot reply to 
Samaritan like this because we have at least an initial appearance of  disagreement, even if  it turns out 
that this is explained as loose talk (and that the judgements that the interlocutors hold do not strictly 
conflict). They do not conflict because they are about different aspects of  one common thing. 
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 The aspectualist view I have described here thus does a better job of  explaining data point 1 — 
that judgements of  whether someone is doing ok exhibit variation across different contexts. It points 
out that we make judgements about different, particular, aspects or well-being but that, for reasons of  
conversational efficiency, we often express these as if  they were judgements of  the whole. Unlike 
Alexandrova’s contextualism, this view explains both of  the following things. First the need for 
Samaritan and Friend to clarify their utterances. Second, the fact that there is an important difference 
between their judgements. 
 By examining Alexandrova’s case for contextualism about well-being we have seen some of  the 
ways in which prudential discourse is context-sensitive. These were as follows: 
 (1) Threshold dependence: In different contexts, different levels of  well-being count as   
 doing well. 
 (2) Aspectualism: in different contexts (academic and everyday) we are interested in different  
 aspects of well-being or in different close relations to well-being. 
Let me summarise the preceding discussion. I have examined Anna Alexandrova’s case for radical 
contextualism about well-being discourse. Alexandrova drew our attention to apparent differences in 
the way that terms such as ‘is doing well’, ‘well-being’, and ‘doing ok’ are used across different contexts. 
She argued that this data supports a radical form of  contextualism about prudential discourse. I offered 
an alternative account which consisted of  four claims. Firstly, that there is (perfectly innocent) 
looseness in use of  ‘well-being’ across different academic subject matters. Secondly, that Alexandrova is 
correct that there is threshold dependence with respect to expressions such as ‘doing well’, so different 
levels of  well-being count as doing well in different contexts. Thirdly, that we sometimes assess 
someone’s level of  well-being relative to groups to which they belong. Finally, that in different contexts 
we pick out different aspects of  well-being and engage in loose talk when making claims about them. My 
alternative is a mild form of  context-sensitivity, one that retains the idea that well-being is 
fundamentally context-insensitive, even if  it is a matter of  context which aspects of well-being we talk 
about and which levels of  well-being count as doing well. 
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 In the rest of  the paper I will address another threat to the view that prudential value discourse 
is conceptually unitary and context-insensitive. This comes in the form of  Steve Campbell’s recent 
argument that there are plural prudential value concepts. 
4. CAMPBELL’S CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM  
Campbell starts off  by noting that work on well-being depends on the assumption of  a single subject 
matter: 
Hedonists, desire-fulfillment theorists, perfectionists, and objective-list theorists generally take 
themselves to be in genuine disagreement with each other over a common subject matter that is 
both coherent and significant. Likewise, analyses of  well-being are often presented as casting 
new light on the concept or property of  well-being.   14
This is undeniable as a claim about the literature. Campbell, however, thinks that we should reject the 
assumption. I will first present and explain Campbell’s view before moving on to examine the 
justification he gives for it. Campbell’s view is thus: 
 Conceptual pluralism: despite the appearance of  a univocal subject matter, prudential   
 discourse involves distinct (sets of) concepts, meaning that at least some apparent instances of   
 fundamental substantive prudential disagreements are, in fact, instances of  talking past each   
 other. 
There is a clear affinity between this and Alexandrova’s contextualism but Campbell’s view is explicitly 
framed as a claim about distinct concepts. Here is a reconstruction of  the first part of  Campbell’s 
argument for conceptual pluralism: 
 Campbell (2016: 408).14
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(1) Prudential discourse manifests mutually-conflicting commitments.  15
(2) If  prudential discourse manifests mutually-conflicting commitments there is no univocal 
subject matter. 
(I will momentarily give some examples of  the mutually-conflicting commitments referred to in (1).) 
Suppose for the moment that we accept (1) and (2). What could we conclude on their basis? There are 
at least two options. We might hold an incoherentist error theory about prudential discourse. On such a 
view, although, within prudential discourse, we presume that there is a single, coherent, subject matter 
for well-being, we actually use the concept in fundamentally inconsistent ways, resulting in the 
discourse being incoherent. Alternatively, we could conclude that despite the appearance of  a single set of  
concepts, and so one subject matter, there is in fact a set of  distinct concepts, so conceptual pluralism is 
true. 
 Campbell leaves aside the first, incoherentist error-theoretic, possibility. For the sake of  
tractability, I will also assume that we have reason to reject incoherentism, such that anyone who 
accepts (1) & (2) could infer conceptual pluralism.  Thus Campbell’s argument can be interpreted thus: 16
(1) Prudential discourse manifests mutually-conflicting commitments. 
(2) If  prudential discourse manifests mutually-conflicting commitments then there is no univocal 
subject matter. 
(3) If  (1) and (2) then either an incoherentist error theory is true or conceptual pluralism is true. 
(4) Incoherentist error theory is false. 
Therefore, 
(5) Conceptual pluralism is true. 
 Campbell’s discussion is officially about prudential theorising, so officially he has in mind the context of  15
philosophers discussing prudential value. I take the discussion in the first half  of  the paper to provide a case 
against conceptual pluralism among non-philosophers who engage in prudential discourse. For brevity, I will 
continue to discuss Campbell’s view as if  it is about prudential discourse in general but my arguments focus on 
the more theoretical context that he is officially focused upon.
 The case I give against Campbell’s conceptual pluralism also tells against incoherentist prudential error theory. 16
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I now move on to assessing Campbell’s argument. 
5. ASSESSING CAMPBELL’S CASE FOR PREMISES (1) & (2) 
Campbell is clearly correct that prudential thought and talk, both by philosophers and non-
philosophers, manifests inconsistent commitments. On one interpretation of  premise (1) it is made true 
by the fact that we find first-order prudential disagreements, such as on whether knowledge is beneficial 
for its own sake or only instrumentally. Given that we are not, for example, tempted by contextualism 
about ‘economic growth’ claims on the basis of  disagreement within economic discourse, Campbell’s 
argument needs more than simple first-order disagreement. Thus, for certain forms of  disagreement, 
the truth of  premise (1) is insufficient to justify premise (2). For Campbell’s argument to work he must 
therefore identify deep, fundamental, disagreement within prudential discourse. This is clear from the way 
he seeks to justify premise (1). He aims to identify conflicting highly general commitments within 
prudential discourse and to show that these are incompatible. 
 Before outlining these putative conflicting commitments, let me outline the strategy for 
responding to them. I will argue that we do not find disagreements within prudential discourse of  the 
sort that can justify premise (2) of  Campbell’s argument. This will be for different reasons for different 
putative commitments, thus my response is (of  necessity) piecemeal. In some cases a kind of  defusing 
strategy is available. This is because the commitments turn out, on closer inspection, to be genuine but 
non-conflicting. For other putative conflicts I argue that the commitments are non-fundamental and 
best explained in a way that does not favour conceptual pluralism. I will now examine the conflicting 
commitments within prudential discourse that Campbell puts forward in support of  premise (1). 
Putative Conflict (I) Relation to the subject’s attitudes 
Campbell claims that some of  the ways in which we think about prudential value suggest that well-
being is closely connected to the subject’s attitudes whereas other ways we think about well-being 
suggest that well-being is not closely related to the subject’s attitudes.  
 As examples of  the former commitment, Campbell points to our tendency to think that self-
sacrifice must be felt and that reward and punishment are necessarily connected to feelings: 
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 A concept of  well-being that does not bear any essential connection to the attitudes of  the   
 person will be ill suited to characterize the sort of  “benefits” and “costs” that we seek to   
 bestow on others when we reward, give gifts, do favors, punish, and take revenge.   17
As examples of  the corresponding conflicting commitment, one that downplays a connection between 
well-being and subjects’ attitudes, Campbell points to our willingness to think of  certain states or 
properties of  a person as deserving of  pity, irrespective of  the person’s own attitude towards them. He 
gives the following example: 
 [J]udgments of  pitiability, enviability, and luckiness need not depend upon the subject’s own   
 attitudes toward these things. I can intelligibly think someone who is descended from one of   
 the world’s great novelists is enviable and lucky in that regard even if  she herself  is completely  
 unmoved by this fact about her genealogy. I can believe that my neighbor is pitiable for lying to  
 others even if  she has no reservations or regrets about it, and even takes great pride in her skills 
 of  deception. This suggests that the concept of  well-being must be quite broad and must allow  
 for the possibility that something’s being good or bad for a person bears no essential   
 connection to his or her favorable or unfavorable attitudes.  18
My reply is that, properly understood, the plausible ideas here do not conflict. I agree with Campbell 
that it is intelligible that someone is pitiable for lying to others or that it is enviable to be descended from 
one of  the world’s great novelists. My reservations therefore concern the other putative requirement, 
that well-being be essentially connected to the attitudes of  the person as well as the claim that these two  
commitments are in conflict. 
 Campbell’s description of  the requirement suggests that it is a fundamental commitment of  
prudential discourse that for someone to be punished, or rewarded, or the subject of  revenge, etc that 
 Campbell (2016: 411).17
 Campbell (2016: 410).18
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must be partly explained by their having the relevant kinds of  attitude (presumably a pro attitude for a 
reward, a con attitude for a punishment). 
 In reply, note, first, that it is not obvious that it is a fundamental commitment of  prudential 
discourse that for someone to be punished, or rewarded, or the subject of  revenge, etc that must be 
partly explained by their having the relevant kinds of  attitude. Suppose that Y takes their revenge upon 
X by simply preventing good things from happening to X, unbeknownst to them. For example, they 
prevent some superior job offer which would have improved X’s life from accruing. Similarly, suppose 
that a kindly benefactor rewards you by preventing something bad from happening to you. For 
example, your car gets an erroneous ticket but your benefactor, realising that it will be expensive for you 
to prove this, simply pays it for you (thus you never learn, or suspect, that you were to experience this 
setback). These are plausible cases of  revenge and reward. If  so, then it is not necessary for something 
to be revenge or reward that it bring about actual pro or con attitudes.  
 Furthermore, we can explain away such an essential connection, by explaining why it might 
seem like there is such a connection even where there is not. To do so we need only to note that it will 
very often be the case that punishments, favours, revenge, and reward will trigger and be partly 
constituted by pro and con attitudes. And that holds for two reasons. First, that many of  the good and 
bad prudential states are themselves attitudinal at least in part (pain and pleasure being plausible 
examples). Second, that in typical cases we know that we are being punished etc and feel bad about 
that. But this is to stop far short of  postulating the kind of  essential connection Campbell suggests is a 
commitment of  prudential discourse. 
 A natural reply here, on Campbell’s behalf, is to appeal to either dispositional pro and con 
attitudes or hypothetical attitudes. That is, Campbell might argue that my cases work against only a 
crude understanding of  this essential connection, namely one between punishment (etc) and actual and 
occurrent con (etc) attitudes but that they do not show that there is no connection between 
punishment (etc) and dispositional attitudes.  This leads to my second reply. 
Reply 2 - such a connection is not problematic 
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Suppose, for the sake of  argument, that there is an essential connection between punishment (etc) and 
dispositional (or hypothetical) con and pro attitudes. How much does this show with respect to the 
concept of  prudential value? Plausibly, not very much. After all, there is no incompatibility between 
holding that some, but not all, aspects of  prudential value are essentially connected to the agent’s pro or 
con attitudes. And one might argue that even if  revenge has such a connection, this does little to establish 
that prudential value generally relates to the agent’s attitudes in some deep way. One way of  defending 
this manoeuvre is by arguing that we have a connection to the agent’s pro and con attitudes in the case 
of  punishment and reward because of  the nature of  punishment and reward themselves (namely that it 
is in the essential nature of  these things that they are related to the agent’s attitudes). On such a view, 
there is no deep conflict between (i) the idea that punishment and revenge have an essential relation to 
the agent’s attitudes (albeit hypothetical or dispositional ones) and (ii) the idea that prudential value 
does not have such a connection in general. 
 Campbell’s claim that we are deeply committed to an essential connection between attitudes and 
well-being, and that this is in tension with another commitment about well-being, can thus be resisted 
in two ways. First, we can deny that there is such a connection. Second, we can dispute that the 
connection demonstrates a fundamental feature of  the concept of  prudential value. If  either of  these is 
correct then Campbell has not identified a genuinely conflicting pair of  commitments within prudential 
discourse. 
Putative Conflict (II) Relation to Morality 
Campbell puts forward a second candidate inconsistency in prudential discourse — that although we 
sometimes have a morality-including conception of  well-being (such as in the passage above, where it 
seems intelligible that someone merits pity on account of  lying), we also sometimes have a morality-
excluding conception of  well-being. As he puts it: 
Still other aspects of  the standard picture suggest a more restrictive concept of  well-being—in 
particular, one that screens off  the possibility that acting morally, in and of  itself, is good for 
us. The egoist is standardly defined as one whose sole ultimate aim is the promotion of  his or 
her own well-being. Yet, many philosophers have seen the egoist as a natural critic of  morality 
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and someone who must be convinced that being moral can, by some indirect route, serve his or 
her own best interests. They do not seriously entertain the possibility that the egoist might view 
being moral as an important component of  the good life. What may underlie this tendency is 
an assumption that well-being is morality-excluding in the following sense: it is either 
impossible or deeply implausible that being moral is intrinsically good for us.  19
From these observations, he concludes: 
All of  this appears to indicate that the standard picture of  well-being is a conflation of  two or 
more concepts. A single concept could not possibly satisfy all of  these demands. It cannot be 
the concept of  something that is both independent from and dependent upon the attitudes of  
the subject. It cannot both include and exclude being moral as a possible component of  well- 
being.  20
Pace Campbell, I think that there could be a single concept of  well-being which both includes and 
excludes being moral as a possible component of  well-being. To see this possibility, let us distinguish 
something’s being a non-instrumental prudential value — its being non-instrumentally good for you — 
from its being in your best interests.  With this distinction in hand, one could hold that acting morally  21
— or, more strongly, exemplifying virtue —  is good for the agent to some extent while also holding that 
being moral is not always in our best interests. This would yield an explanation of  how well-being can 
both include and exclude being moral, without the need to postulate multiple concepts. 
 Invoking this distinction between what is good for someone and what is in their best interests is 
not ad hoc. The distinction between something’s being good for someone to some extent and its being best 
for them is one that ordinary prudential thought and historical work on well-being has been slow to 
recognise. It is perfectly coherent to hold that being moral is not always in one’s best interests even if  
one thinks that some vices or some immoral behaviour are bad for the person who performs them and 
 Campbell (2016: 411).19
 Campbell (2016: 411).20
 For discussion of  this distinction, but in the case of  harm, see Bradley (2012).21
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thus worthy of  pity.  Thus one might agree with Campbell’s observation while denying that it shows 22
that there is more than one concept of  well-being. 
 Finally, note that the idea that it is not in one’s best interests to be moral can be resisted. 
Aristotelian ethical theories aim to show that virtue and the good life are deeply compatible (if  not 
identical).  But we can imagine any number of  other theories that would reconcile these commitments. 23
Suppose one held that friendship is a major source of  prudential value, if  not the only one, but that 
friendship (or the most beneficial kinds of  friendship) are only possible between people who embody 
virtue. On such a view there would be a very close connection between acting well and living well. My 
point here is not to defend this conception. My point is only to show how there are resources from 
within ordinary prudential theorising to render these commitments consistent. Thus, pace Campbell, a 
single concept could satisfy all of  these demands.  24
  So far I have shown how some of  the putatively conflicting commitments offered by Campbell 
can be made consistent. I now move on to assessing a final, stronger, candidate for such conflicting 
commitments that might be offered, before showing how it too can be undermined. 
Putative Conflict (III) Experience versus Desire Satisfaction 
Two everyday prudential platitudes are that what you do not know cannot hurt you and that it is always good for 
you to get what you want. These claims exemplify two tendencies in prudential thought. The first is the 
tendency to think that prudential value is necessarily experiential, in the sense that everything that is non-
instrumentally good or bad for you is experienced (or, at least, affects your experience). This is what 
motivate some to defend an ‘experience requirement’ on prudential value. Roughly put, this is the 
requirement that for something to be a non-instrumental prudential value it must either be experienced 
by the relevant agent or make some difference to their experience. If  there is such a requirement then it 
 Note the way that the distinction is elided in the discussion at the beginning of  Plato’s Republic.22
 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Annas (1993), Hursthouse (1999).23
 There is also the plausibility of  treating our pity for someone’s immoral behaviour as being directed towards 24
the consequences of  being known to be immoral: punishment, ostracisation and the like. 
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is true that what you do not know (more precisely, what you do not experience) cannot hurt you (non-
instrumentally).  25
 The second tendency is to think that prudential value is necessarily a matter of  getting what you 
want. It is clear that everyday prudential thought displays some commitment to the idea that getting 
what you want is good for you. This has led some philosophers to defend an anti-alienation constraint 
on prudential value (holding that having a pro attitude towards P is necessary for P being good for you) 
or, going further, to treat desire-satisfaction as necessary and sufficient for prudential value.   26
 These two constraints, however, cannot both be satisfied. Here are cases that illustrate the clash 
between them: 
 Case 1: Delphine believes that she is married to a wonderful person and that they have a secure, 
 loving relationship, all she ever wanted. However, and unbeknownst to her, a tragic case of    
 mistaken identity means that she is in fact married to an undercover police officer. This person  
 has deceived Delphine into loving them and does not  care at all about her. All of  her friends  
 are also undercover officers who pretend to like her in order to monitor her. Her entire   
 romantic and personal life is a sham.  27
 Case 2: Hillary is a research scientist who desires three things. She wants Leicester City to win  
 the Premier League, she wants her research to be recognised by her peers, and she wants her  
 self-published fiction to be well received. All of  these desires are satisfied but Hillary knows   
 none of  this. She is on a solo long-term research expedition to a remote location and cannot  
 receive updates from the outside world. She is confident that her desires are not satisfied and  
 when she left for the base she had excellent evidence that her  desires would never be fulfilled.  
 She is very unhappy. 
In the first case, to the extent that one endorses the view that prudential value is necessarily experiential 
(and more specifically hedonic), one will hold that Delphine’s life is going well. After all, it is a pleasant 
 For an overview of  the debate on the experience requirement, see Hawkins (2016).25
 On anti-alienation constraints see for example: Dorsey (2017), Hall & Tiberius (2016), Hawkins (2014), 26
Fletcher (2013), Railton (2003). One of  the most sophisticated proposed constraints — one which does not take 
prudential value to be constrained by the actual, present, attitudes of  the person — comes from Rosati (1996). 
For discussion of  her proposal see Sarch (2010).
 Case based on the infamous ‘spycops’ case in the UK. For details, see: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-27
news/2015/nov/20/met-police-apologise-women-had-relationships-with-undercover-officers .
!25
sham and she never finds out (we can stipulate). By contrast, to the extent that one thinks that 
prudential value is a matter of  getting what you want, one will judge that this life is going badly. In case 
2, to the extent that well-being is experiential, Hillary’s life is going badly. By contrast, to the extent that 
one thinks that prudential value is a matter of  desire-fulfilment, it is going well. 
 This is, then, another place where the professed commitments of  prudential discourse manifest 
an apparent inconsistency. Does this tell in favour of  conceptual pluralism? Again, I think not. It is 
highly dubitable that prudential discourse manifests a deep commitment to the idea that getting what 
you want is, ipso facto, good for you. I thus want to grant that these ideas conflict but stand my ground 
against the idea that both commitments are really manifested within prudential discourse.  
 Cases like Hillary function in philosophical discussion as a reductio of  the view that desire-
satisfaction is, itself, of  prudential value. For that reason, few philosophers hold the view that desire-
satisfaction per se has prudential value.  And the reasons for this lack of  attraction to the view are 28
obvious. It yields implausible results in cases like Hillary, where the desire is fulfilled but the agent has 
no idea that it is. Furthermore, we can explain why people have typically closely associated desire 
fulfilment with well-being, through the simple observations that people typically desire that their lives 
go well and they typically desire the things that are plausible for candidates for prudential value 
(pleasure, friendship etc). Desire satisfaction is thus a useful proxy for what is good for someone, even 
if  it is an imperfect indicator. Thus we can explain away the idea that prudential discourse is deeply 
committed to the idea that desire satisfaction per se has prudential value. By doing so we eliminate 
another candidate for a pair of  mutually conflicting deep commitments within prudential discourse. 
 Campbell’s argument concluded that conceptual pluralism is the best explanation of  the 
disagreement we find when we examining prudential discourse. I have argued against the data he 
offered as evidence of  conceptual pluralism. But I want to offer an independent argument for why 
conceptual pluralism is not the best explanation of  prudential disagreement. 
 It is easy to overstate both the extent of  prudential disagreement and the extent to which it is 
of  the sort that would motivate pluralism. The sort of  disagreement that would motivate pluralism 
 The view has a peculiar status in the philosophical literature on well-being. It is a mainstay of  discussion but 28
has exceedingly few historical or contemporary defenders (in its pure form). 
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would be systematic divergence in the judgements that people make about which things are good and bad 
for people or which lives were going well or badly. But it seems clear that these kind of  judgements are 
subject to wide agreement.  
 Where we find disagreement is in the explanation of  prudential value, on the question of  why 
things are good or bad for people, or why someone’s life is going well or badly. But when it comes to 
these questions, a plausible explanation is, simply, that philosophical questions are difficult despite the 
fact that they can seem easy. Our disagreement about the explanatory questions of  why fundamentally e.g. 
someone’s life is going well or going badly reflects the difficulty of  philosophical questions, and the 
subtlety of  the difference between different substantive views of  well-being, not the truth of  
conceptual pluralism about prudential value. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have examined two views of  prudential discourse as radically context-sensitive. I argued 
that we do not have reason to favour Alexandrova’s radical contextualism over an alternative 
aspectualist view, coupled with the concession that prudential discourse is context-sensitive in benign 
ways (such as loose talk as to what is meant by ‘well-being’ in different contexts and the fact that 
context determines who counts as ‘doing well’ ). In the second part of  the paper I argued, contrary to 
Campbell, that the inconsistent commitments and disagreement that we see in prudential discourse do 
not provide good evidence for conceptual pluralism about prudential discourse. 
 I do not pretend to have provided a master argument against prudential discourse contexualism. 
Rather, I hope to have shown that we do not yet have a good case for contextualism about prudential 
discourse, as well as providing both a license for pessimism in this regard and an alternative to 
contextualism in the form of  aspectualism. 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